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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 mandated citizenship 
verification requirements on the Medicaid coverage of children using state administrative data 
from Georgia.  Our analysis focuses on children enrolled in Medicaid prior to the reform in the 
eligibility category for which the reform is most likely to be binding.  We find that these children 
were slightly more likely to exit during the first "high impact" recertification in which the 
enhanced citizenship verification was binding than children whose first recertification occurred 
just prior to the reform.  In addition, we observe a slightly lower re-entry probability among 
children exiting during a "high impact" first recertification.  Assuming at least some of the 
exiting children are non-citizens, the fact that the exit and re-entry rates associated with a “high 
impact” first recertification are only modestly different from other first recertification months 
suggests that the reform is probably not having a dramatic impact on citizens. 
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Introduction 
 A persistent issue associated with the design of transfer programs in the United States 
(and immigration policy more generally) is whether or not non-citizens are eligible to participate 
in such programs.  Requiring citizenship for program participation introduces the questions of 
what constitutes sufficient proof of citizenship and whether or not requiring such proof imposes a 
significant barrier to participation.  Given this backdrop, a relatively recent Federal rule change 
regarding citizenship verification requirements in state Medicaid programs has received 
considerable attention in the popular press.1  Beginning in July 2006, the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005 (DRA) required most new Medicaid applicants, as well as most current beneficiaries (at 
their next recertification of eligibility), to document their citizenship.  Acceptable documentation 
includes a U.S. passport, birth certificate or driver’s license from a state that verifies social 
security numbers.  The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of this change on the 
Medicaid coverage of children using state administrative data from Georgia.   
 Previous research (Scrivner and Wolfe, 2005; Bansak and Raphael, 2006) suggests that, 
in general, increases in the complexity of application and renewal requirements within public 
insurance programs will lead to reductions in take up rates.  Thus, if a programmatic priority 
going forward is to increase the take up rate of uncovered eligible children, it will be important 
to have a better understanding of how increases in the requirements to document citizenship 
impact participation in public health insurance programs.  This topic takes on added significance 
because of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), as states must verify the citizenship status of 
individuals obtaining subsidies for coverage through state health insurance exchanges and 
noncitizens remain ineligible for expanded Medicaid coverage. 
                                                 
1 See for example the following article in the New York Times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/washington/05medicaid.html?_r=0 
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According to the CMS website, prior to July 2006, individuals were not eligible for 
Medicaid unless they were either American citizens or qualified aliens; however, beneficiaries 
could self-declare their citizenship status by checking a box on the application form under 
penalty of perjury.  The DRA required, staring in July 2006, actual documentary evidence of a 
person’s status when applying for Medicaid coverage or, if already enrolled, when recertifying 
coverage.  This must be enforced by states in order to receive their federal Medicaid match.2   
In what appears to be practically the only academic study on this subject, Sommers 
(2010) uses data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and attempts to identify the impact 
of the enhanced citizenship verification rules by comparing changes in states that already utilized 
enhanced citizenship verification to changes in those that did not prior to the reform.  The results 
suggest that the DRA reduced Medicaid enrollment among non-citizens, as intended, but did not 
significantly affect citizens.   However, these results hinge on the classification of states into the 
treatment or control group depending on their Medicaid citizenship verification policies prior to 
the DRA and, as we will discuss in more detail, coming up with a clean classification strategy for 
these policies is challenging. 
The response of Georgia’s Medicaid program to the DRA provides a unique opportunity 
for us to analyze the impact of enhanced citizenship verification in an environment in which we 
can be certain of the previous institutional background.  Georgia began enhanced citizenship 
verification procedures in its Medicaid program in January 2006, several months before it 
became a federal requirement.  Using Medicaid micro-enrollment data from 2004-2008 provided 
to us by the Georgia Department of Community Health, we identify the impact of the DRA by 
                                                 
2
 For more on what is considered documentary evidence, see the following link from the CMS website:  
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/DeficitReductionAct/Citizenship.html 
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comparing the disenrollment rate and subsequent re-enrollment rate for children whose first 
Medicaid recertification occurs after January 2006 (which we refer to as a “high impact” 
recertification) with those whose first recertification occurs before January 2006.  We focus on 
children in the Medicaid eligibility category most likely to be impacted by the DRA and compare 
them to those jointly enrolled in Medicaid and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, 
as those children were already subject to enhanced citizenship verification.   
Our analysis suggests that children enrolled prior to the reform were slightly more likely 
to exit during the first "high impact" recertification in which the enhanced citizenship 
verification was binding.  In addition, we observe a slightly lower re-entry probability among 
these children as compared to children that exit during a pre-reform first recertification.  
Assuming at least some of the exiting children are non-citizens, the fact that the exit and re-entry 
rates associated with a “high impact” first recertification are only modestly different from other 
first recertification months suggests that the reform is probably not having a dramatic impact on 
citizens. 
Literature Review    
States face competing priorities when implementing public health insurance programs.  
One such challenge is balancing the accuracy of eligibility determination with the ease of 
Medicaid enrollment for eligible individuals.3  This is especially true given DRA enhanced 
citizenship verification requirements and the incentives given to states for administrative 
simplification and increased enrollment under the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) of 2009.  In addition, under the ACA, states must balance the 
eligibility policies and system linkages required between the health insurance exchanges and 
                                                 
3 See Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) for a recent theoretical analysis of this issue. 
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Medicaid with the shrinking pool of federal uncompensated care dollars in order to minimize use 
of state funds and assure individuals are enrolled in appropriate coverage programs.   
Prior to DRA enactment, the Office of the Inspector General recognized this challenge 
and reported on citizenship self-declaration policies within Medicaid (OIG, 2005).  In a 
descriptive study of state Medicaid directors, the OIG found that most states allowing self-
declaration of citizenship reported they had not seen a problem with noncitizens gaining 
Medicaid coverage as evidenced by their post eligibility quality control activities.  Only one 
State, Oregon, quantified the problem, estimating that about one percent of their mailed-in 
Medicaid applications (OIG, 2005) had citizenship-related problems.  Medicaid directors also 
indicated that if all Medicaid applicants were required to provide documentary evidence of U.S. 
citizenship then this would delay eligibility determinations, increase eligibility personnel costs, 
as well as be burdensome for applicants (OIG, 2005). 
 The peer-reviewed literature supports the notion that decreasing the administrative 
burden for applicants leads to increases in take-up of public coverage.  Studies of state policies 
suggest that eliminating asset tests, allowing for presumptive eligibility, offering continuous 
coverage, simplifying applications, reducing waiting periods, and increasing outreach activities 
all have a positive impact on take-up  (Bansak & Raphael, 2007, Wolfe & Scrivner, 2005, 
Bronchetti, 2014).   Furthermore, transitions between Medicaid and separate CHIP programs 
(Ketsche et al., 2007a), changes from passive to an active renewal process (Herndon et al., 
2008), welfare reform (Watson, 2014), managed care implementation (Marton, Yelowitz, & 
Talbert, 2014, Marton & Yelowitz, 2015), as well as premium increases (Marton, 2007, Kenney 
et al., 2006, Marton, Ketsche & Zhou, 2009, Marton et al., 2015) lead to reductions in enrollment 
and increase gaps in coverage, otherwise known as churning.   
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Thus, this prior research suggests that the implementation of increased citizenship 
documentation requirements should negatively impact enrollment and is consistent with the self-
reported survey research done by the Government Accounting Office of 44 states post-DRA 
implementation (GAO, 2007).  The GAO reported that citizenship documentation requirements 
resulted in enrollment declines for eligible citizens and posed administration burdens on states.  
Of those surveyed, 22 of the 44 states reported a decline in enrollment, 12 reported no change 
and 10 stated that they did not know the effect of the requirement.  In its response to the GAO, 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) questioned the validity of the results 
saying they were all based on anecdotal statements without supporting data analysis to attribute 
all declines to the new requirements.  
 A Commonwealth Fund Report identified enrollment declines by a closer examination of 
data from seven states during the six months that followed implementation of the enhanced 
citizenship verification rules compared to the six months that preceded the change (Summer, 
2009).  This study found that the new citizenship documentation requirements made the 
enrollment and renewal process more complex, administratively burdensome, and costly.  
Summer (2009) also found the impact on applicants and beneficiaries differed by state 
depending, in part, on the state’s infrastructure and approach to implementation.  Several states 
reported that while the policy is aimed at undocumented immigrants, predominantly Hispanics in 
the United States, it was more likely to negatively impact other population groups who are 
citizens and eligible for public programs (Summer, 2009, Ross, 2007).  Angus & Devoe (2010) 
looked specifically at Oregon’s Family Planning Program implemented through a Medicaid 
waiver.  They found an association between enhanced Medicaid citizenship documentation 
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requirements and reductions in access to family planning for young adults and as well as an 
increasing strain on the social safety net.   
Sommers (2010) uses the CPS to estimate a difference-in-differences model to compare 
four states (Montana, Georgia, New Hampshire, and New York) classified by the author as not 
having major changes in Medicaid citizenship verification policy with all other states before and 
after the implementation of the DRA.  The extent to which these four states had consistent 
Medicaid citizenship verification procedures during the time period analyzed is debatable.  
Obviously, the purpose of our paper is to examine changes made in Georgia.  Perhaps the fact 
that Georgia enhanced its Medicaid citizenship verification procedures six months prior to the 
DRA requirement led to some confusion as to its classification.  In addition, Ross and Cox 
(2007) point out that while the other "control" states (Montana, New Hampshire, and New York) 
required proof of citizenship before the DRA mandate, " ... their rules were significantly easier to 
meet than the new federal requirement since a greater variety of documents were acceptable and 
photocopies, rather than originals or certified copies, were permitted.”  Putting these issues aside, 
Sommers (2010) finds that the DRA reduced Medicaid enrollment among non-citizens, as 
intended, but did not significantly affect citizens.       
Identification Strategy 
 Our analysis focuses on the implementation of enhanced Medicaid citizenship 
verification in Georgia for two reasons: first, we can be more certain about the institutional 
background if we focus on a single state, as opposed to a 50 state study; second, we were 
provided confidential Medicaid enrollment micro-data with which to evaluate this policy change 
from the Georgia Department of Community Health.  Georgia implemented the enhanced 
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Medicaid citizenship verification rules prescribed by the DRA in January 2006, six months prior 
to the Federal requirement.    
Figure 1 graphs total enrollment of children in Georgia Medicaid between July 2003 and 
June 2008.  The number of children in Medicaid rises above 900,000 per month in the months 
just prior to the policy change and then falls to about 750,000 in June 2008.  Obviously, such a 
graph doesn’t account for contemporaneous confounders, such as changes in economic 
conditions.  In addition, an aggregate enrollment count such as this may hide different patterns 
for different types of children. 
 In order to identify the impact of enhanced Medicaid citizenship verification we restrict 
attention to children enrolled through the eligibility category for which the reform was most 
likely to be binding, the “Low Income Medicaid” or “LIM” eligibility category (which is based 
on the 1996 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) income standards).  Our basic 
identification strategy is to restrict attention to children that initiated LIM Medicaid coverage in 
the year prior to the reform and compare the recertification experience of ones that start earlier in 
the year to those that started later in the year.  This is because those that started earlier in the year 
would not be subject to enhanced citizenship verification upon their first eligibility recertification 
whereas those that started later in the year would.  We refer to those experiencing their first 
recertification on or after January 2006 as having a high impact first recertification and others 
as having a low impact first recertification.   
 Figure 2 gives an illustration of two children with a low impact first recertification and 
one child with a high impact first recertification.  Child 1 and child 2 enrolled prior to enhanced 
citizenship verification and also had their first recertification prior to the reform.  Child 3 also 
enrolled prior to enhanced citizenship verification, but faces the stricter requirements at their first 
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recertification.  If there is an impact of this rule change on enrolled children, such high impact 
first recertifications would be the most likely place for it to appear.  In order to assess the 
magnitude of this effect, we can compare the exit rate during these high impact first 
recertifications with the low impact first recertifications that occurred in months just before the 
reform.  Because all of these children started their spell in the year prior to the reform in the 
same eligibility category, they are arguably otherwise similar. 
 As a test of our identification strategy we will perform the same analysis for children 
jointly enrolled in Georgia Medicaid and the federal SSI program.  Because these children are 
enrolled in the SSI program, they were already subject to enhanced citizenship verification.  
Thus we should not expect to see any impact of the Georgia changes we are analyzing on these 
children. 
Data 
 We start with the universe of Georgia Medicaid enrollment records for each month 
between December 2004 and June 2008.  As mentioned, in our analysis we restrict attention to 
the 121,434 Georgia LIM Medicaid spells for children initiated between December 2004 and 
December 2005.  Children initiating these spells did not have to meet the enhanced citizenship 
verification requirement in order to enroll.  In addition, children starting their spell between 
December 2004 and April 2005 (monthly cohorts 1-5) experienced their first recertification prior 
to DRA implementation in Georgia, while children starting their spell between May 2005 and 
December 2006 (monthly cohorts 6-13) experienced their first recertification AFTER DRA 
implementation.    
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the LIM spells that are the focus of our analysis.  
The descriptive statistics are given for all spells as well as separated by those that faced low 
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versus high impact first recertifications.  Overall, the average spell length is 18 months and 81 
percent of the coverage spells end before June 2008.  Spells that are ongoing or initiated in June 
2008 are treated as right-censored.  Spells associated with a low impact first recertification 
appear to be slightly more likely to end in an exit as compared to spells associated with a high 
impact first recertification.  This may seem somewhat surprising, but it is important to remember 
that the reform does not impact all enrolled children at the same time.  This motivates our 
approach of focusing on months in which we are most likely to see an impact of the reform and 
compare them to otherwise similar months.    
Empirical Specification 
 While simple enrollment counts (such as those presented in figure 1) can shed some light 
on the impact of these policy changes, as mentioned above, the aggregate nature of the data does 
not allow for an analysis of differential responses by children of different ages and races, or in 
different parts of the state.  Therefore, we use a hazard model approach to estimate the impact of 
the reform on the duration of each LIM child's enrollment in Medicaid using the 121,434 spells 
described in table 1.  The hazard model we estimate is specified in equation (1) below:  
 
H(t) = exp(X1t’β1)* exp(tα1 + t2α2) (1) 
 
 Here we are estimating the impact of the observable characteristics parametrically using 
the standard proportional hazards functional form (exp(X1t’β1)). Included in the vector X1t are 
dummies for high impact first recertification months, low impact first recertification months, and 
other recertification months. 
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 We also include in this vector the demographic controls described in table 1 and an 
indicator for any months with a higher than average unemployment rate.  A key component of 
any analysis of time varying covariates is the proper specification of the baseline hazard.  Rather 
than modeling the baseline hazard in the standard way (using the Weibull distribution), we 
include a quadratic in time on the right hand side of our model (exp(tαj1 + t2αj2)) to control for 
any general temporal patterns in program exits.  While our approach to modeling the baseline 
hazard is still ultimately a parametric one, it does provide more flexibility than the Weibull 
distribution.4   
Results 
Impact on Enrollment Duration for Enrolled Children 
 Table 2 provides estimation results for equation (1) using the 121,434 LIM Medicaid 
child enrollment spells described in table 1.  The key coefficient of interest is on the high impact 
first recertification indicator, because these are the months in which the enhanced citizenship 
verification was first binding for children in monthly cohorts 6-13.  The estimated hazard 
coefficient associated with the high impact first recertification indicator is 2.62 and highly 
statistically significant.  This suggests that children enrolled in a high impact first recertification 
month are 162 percent more likely to exit relative to other months.  When compared to the 
average monthly exit probability in the sample of 4.57 percent, this coefficient represents a 
monthly exit probability of 11.96 percent.  We call this the “absolute effect” associated with a 
high impact first recertification.   
 We can compare this exit rate to that of the first (low impact) rectification of children in 
monthly cohorts 1-5, who were enrolled just prior to the reform and as a result were not exposed 
                                                 
4 Marton et al. (2010) use a similar approach to estimate the impact of premium changes on the duration of 
enrollment in public coverage. 
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to enhanced citizenship verification during their first recertification.  The estimated hazard 
coefficient for a low impact first recertification is 2.10 and also highly statistically significant.  
This implies that the monthly exit rate associated with a low impact first recertification is 9.61 
percent, which is lower than the 11.96 percent monthly exit rate associated with a high impact 
first recertification.  Note that we cannot observe directly whether or not children exiting are 
non-citizens, rather we are inferring this from the timing of their exit. 
These might seem like big differences relative to the baseline, it is important to remember 
that exit rates during recertification months are always higher than during non-recertification 
months.  For this reason, we also include controls for all other re-certifications in the model 
(estimated hazard coefficient 1.21, absolute effect 5.53 percent).  Table 2 also suggests that male 
and non-white children are overall less likely to exit as are children aged 12 and under, when 
compared to children aged 13 to 18.  The linear and quadratic time trend terms that model the 
baseline hazard suggest that children are more likely to exit over time.5   
Disenrollment Simulation 
 In order to compare the magnitude of the high impact recertification coefficient with the 
low impact recertification coefficients, we simulated the number of monthly exits for an initial 
cohort of 100,000 enrollees over the course of one year under two scenarios: 1) their six month 
recertification is high impact and their twelve month recertification is an "other" recertification 
                                                 
5 An alternative to including the recertification dummies would be to instead include a post-DRA enhanced 
citizenship verification dummy on the right hand side of the model.  We expect that such an approach would be a 
noisy indicator of the impact of the reform because it simply compares each child’s experience in the pre-reform 
period versus the post-reform period.  As discussed above, a child that enrolls just prior to the reform, say December 
2005, would not have to provide enhanced citizenship on January 1, 2006.  Instead, this would be required at their 
six month recertification in May 2006.  If the child provides the proper documentation and meets any other 
eligibility requirements, then their coverage will continue and additional citizenship documentation will not be 
required during future re-certifications.  If they cannot, then they will be dis-enrolled.  A simple post-period dummy 
would treat May 2006 the same as any other post-reform month.  Thus this example suggests that a post-period 
dummy would not be the best way to isolate the impact of the reform.     
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and 2) their six month recertification is low impact and their twelve month recertification is an 
"other" recertification.  The results of these simulations are reported in table 3.  To explain in 
more detail, consider first the “high impact” column.  We apply the average monthly exit rate in 
the data (4.57 percent) at the end of months 1-5, so at the end of month 5 there are 79,142 
enrollees remaining.  In month 6 we apply the high impact recertification monthly exit rate of 
11.96 percent, which results in a larger reduction relative to any of the previous months.  We 
then apply the average monthly exit rate in months 7-11 and the other recertification monthly 
exit rate at the end of month 12.  In this scenario, there are 52,094 children left at the end of the 
year, assuming no new entry. 
 We model the “low impact” scenario in a similar fashion, plugging in the appropriate 
recertification exit rate at the end of month 6 and month 12.  Table 3 illustrates that there is little 
difference in the number of children remaining by the end of the year.  The high impact scenario 
results in an additional 1,390 exits relative to the low impact scenario.  Therefore, the high 
impact scenario leads to an additional 1.39 percent of the initial cohort of 100,000 exiting by the 
end of the year.   
We can compare this to estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants in Georgia 
produced by the Urban Institute (Passel, Caps, and Fix, 2004) that suggest undocumented 
immigrants make up 2.5-3.5 percent of the total Georgia population.  If we apply these 
percentages directly to our hypothetical cohort of 100,000 LIM Medicaid children, then we 
estimate that 2,500-3,500 of these children are non-citizens.  This is likely an upper-bound 
estimate, since we expect that adults make up a larger proportion of the total population of non-
citizens.  A comparison of our simulated number of additional exits as a result of the high impact 
recertifications (1,390 children) to this estimate of the number of LIM Medicaid non-citizen 
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children (2,500-3,500 children) suggests that our simulation results produce numbers that are 
consistent with estimates of the size of the non-citizen population.  In other words, if our 
simulation produced an estimate of an additional 6,000 exits as a result of high impact first 
recertifications then we would be suspicious because there are probably not that many non-
citizens in a cohort of 100,000 children.   
Impact on Re-enrollment for Children that Exit Coverage  
 As table 2 suggests, we observe 98,788 exits (81 percent) among the 121,434 Medicaid 
LIM enrollment spells in our dataset.  We are interested in knowing how many of these children 
regain public coverage.  In order to analyze this question we constructed a dataset consisting of 
spells of "non-coverage" or "between coverage" spells for the Medicaid LIM children in our 
sample.  Thus these 98,788 between coverage spells are triggered by an exit of a Medicaid LIM 
child from coverage, so these exits occurred any time between January 2005 and June 2008 (42 
months).   
 Among these 98,788 exits, 18,618 (19 percent) occur during a high impact first 
recertification month and 7,151 (7 percent) occur during a low impact recertification in the pre-
reform time period.  Because we suspect that the modestly larger number of exits that occurred 
during a high impact first recertification is most likely to be tied to the enhanced citizenship 
verification rules, we are especially interested in how many of those children re-enter public 
health insurance coverage.  If a child is not a citizen, then they should not, by definition, be able 
to re-enter Medicaid or CHIP.  If we observe the child re-entering public coverage, then their 
parents must have presented the appropriate citizenship documentation with their subsequent 
application.    
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Table 4 reports the results of our re-entry analysis.  Among the 18,618 high impact first 
recertification exits that we observe in our sample, 6,684 (36 percent) subsequently re-enroll in 
either Medicaid or CHIP.  Among these re-enrollees 53 percent re-enroll via the LIM eligibility 
category of Medicaid, 39 percent re-enroll via the “Right from the Start Medicaid” (RSM) 
eligibility category of Medicaid, and 7 percent re-enroll through the CHIP program.  As 
mentioned above, these 6,684 children would not be allowed back into Medicaid or CHIP if they 
were not citizens.  We might ask whether or not 36 percent is a large proportion of re-enrollees.  
One way to answer is to compare this to the proportion of children that re-enroll after a low 
impact first recertification exit in the pre-reform period.  We find that 41 percent of the children 
that exit during a low impact first recertification month re-enroll in Medicaid or CHIP before the 
end of our analysis time period.  Thus the modestly lower rates of exit and re-entry associated 
with the high impact first recertifications could be explained by non-citizens exiting due to 
stricter citizenship verification and, as a result, not returning. 
  If we assume that at least some of the exiting children are non-citizens, the fact that the 
exit and re-entry rates associated with the high impact first recertification months are only 
modestly different from low impact first recertification months suggests that the reform is 
probably not having a dramatic impact on citizens.  To carry the simulation from table 3 a step 
further, we can apply these re-entry probabilities to our simulated number of exits.  We reported 
that an additional 1,390 children out of a cohort of 100,000 children exit in our high impact 
scenario.  If we apply the high impact re-entry probability of 36 percent to these exits, we would 
expect to see 500 return.  This would imply that the net number of “high impact” exits in our 
simulation would be roughly 890 children.  This is again consistent with our rough estimate of 
between 2,500 and 3,500 non-citizen LIM children in our hypothetical cohort. 
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Specification Checks 
Our analysis focuses on LIM children because the citizenship verification policy change 
was clearly binding for that particular eligibility category.  As a specification check we estimate 
the same model for children jointly enrolled in both Medicaid and the SSI program.  These 
children were already subject to both enhanced citizenship and verification, given the federal SSI 
application process.  The results are reported in table 5 and suggest that, in general, there is not 
much exiting occurring among SSI children within Medicaid.  The low impact first 
recertification indicator is not statistically significant and the high impact first recertification 
indicator suggests slightly less exiting during high impact months.  The fact that we don’t see a 
big difference between high and low impact first recertifications in this group of children (that 
started their Medicaid coverage spells at the same time in the same state as the LIM children) 
gives us more confidence that the difference in these recertifications we observe in the LIM 
children is being driven by the enhanced citizenship verification reform. 
 As an additional specification check we re-estimated the model from table 2 with an 
interaction term between the high impact first recertification dummy and the nonwhite indicator.  
If being nonwhite is correlated with being a non-citizen, then we would expect to see a higher 
exit rate among nonwhites during high impact first recertification months.  This is exactly what 
we find, as nonwhites are 32 percent more likely than whites to exit during a high impact first 
recertification month.   
Discussion 
 Previous descriptive analysis of states (GAO (2007), Summer (2009)) suggested that the 
implementation of enhanced citizenship verification in Medicaid had a significant impact on 
enrollment.  On the other hand, Sommers (2010) finds that this policy change did not have a 
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significant impact on citizen enrollment in Medicaid, while one-in-four non-citizen adults and 
one-in-eight non-citizen children were screened out by the policy annually.  Our findings are 
consistent with Sommers (2010), though we argue below that our focus on one state lends more 
credibility to our results. 
 Researchers interested in Medicaid policy often specialize in one of two types of datasets.  
The first type consists of broad publically available datasets, such as the CPS (as used in 
Sommers (2010)) or the SIPP.  The benefits of such datasets include the potential to build a 
nationally representative sample, the ability to analyze differences in policies across states, the 
ability to potentially observe both Medicaid enrollees and those not enrolled, and detailed 
demographic data, such as citizenship status.  The drawbacks include small sample sizes within 
individual states, the challenge of understanding policy nuances for all 50 state Medicaid 
programs, and difficulty in correctly identifying Medicaid recipients.  In addition, datasets such 
as the CPS don't allow researchers to follow the same individuals for an extended period of time.    
 The second type of dataset involves administrative program data from one or a small 
number of states (as we use in this paper for Georgia).  Obviously, Medicaid administrative data 
doesn't provide information on those not enrolled in the program, so analysis using this data is 
typically conditioned on program participation.  In addition, this sort of data does not often 
include detailed demographic data and cannot claim to represent the entire country.  On the other 
hand, Medicaid state administrative data clearly identifies program participants and allows 
researchers to limit their focus.  It is easier to have a deep understanding of the history of 
Medicaid policy in any one state as compared to all 50 states.  The fact that Sommers (2010) 
classifies Georgia as one of four control states with respect to citizenship verification is evidence 
of the difficulty associated with getting the policies associated with each state right. 
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 State Medicaid administrative data may be better suited for analysis of enhanced 
citizenship verification than the CPS.  As our description of the institutional structure of 
Georgia’s Medicaid program suggests, different eligibility categories were subject to different 
citizenship verification rules prior to the DRA.  This knowledge allows us to focus on the 
eligibility category in which we are most likely to see a citizenship effect.  In addition, our 
detailed enrollment data allows us to focus on months in which we are most likely to see a 
citizenship effect.  If we don’t find a large impact for LIM children in the first post-DRA 
recertification then we are not likely to find large impacts anywhere else.  Despite differences in 
approach, our results are broadly consistent with Sommers (2010).  For the reasons just 
described, we would argue that our approach should provide more confidence in our results. 
Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 mandated citizenship 
verification requirements on the Medicaid coverage of children using state administrative data 
from Georgia.  Our analysis suggests that children enrolled via the “Low Income Medicaid” 
eligibility category of Georgia Medicaid (based on the 1996 Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) standards) that were enrolled prior to the reform were slightly more likely to 
exit during high impact first recertifications in which the enhanced citizenship verification was 
binding.  In addition, we observe a slightly lower re-entry probability among these children as 
compared to children that exit during low impact first re-certifications just prior to the reform.  
Assuming at least some of the exiting children are non-citizens, the fact that the exit and re-entry 
rates associated with these “high impact” first recertification months are only modestly different 
from low impact first recertification months suggests that the reform is probably not having a 
dramatic impact on citizens. 
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The ACA adds administrative burden to states by requiring coordination of Medicaid 
eligibility systems with the state insurance exchanges as well as expanding the population 
eligible for subsidized health coverage to a greater percentage of the adult population, who in 
turn, are required to document citizenship and income.   It also provides additional funding to 
states to upgrade information systems and build linkages to data hubs (like the Social Security 
Administration [SSA] and vital record systems) which assists states in documenting citizenship 
and verifying income and reduces the burden on consumers.  In particular, Georgia was able to 
create a permanent electronic record of citizenship status in their Medicaid eligibility system 
through linkage with the SSA so individuals who provide a valid social security number no 
longer need to provide citizenship documentation every time they move to a new county or 
reapply for public coverage.  Our results suggest that enhanced citizenship verification was not 
having a dramatic impact on citizens in Georgia.  This new permanent electronic record of 
citizenship should further minimize the impact of the policy on citizens. 
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Figure 1.  Monthly Enrollment of Children in Georgia Medicaid  
(July 2003 - June 2008) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Different Types of First Recertifications 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Georgia LIM Medicaid Spells 
(initiated between December 2004 & December 2005) 
 
  All Cohorts Low Impact High Impact 
# spells 121,434 40,572 80,862 
Demographics:      
age under 1 17.08% 18.72% 16.26% 
age 1-5 31.32% 31.53% 31.21% 
age 6-12 28.19% 27.21% 28.68% 
age 13-18 23.41% 22.54% 23.85% 
Female 51.00% 51.10% 50.94% 
non-white 66.56% 64.14% 67.77% 
Atlanta metro 40.84% 38.10% 42.22% 
Spell characteristics:       
avg. spell length (months) 17.80 19.75 16.82 
Spells ending in an observed exit 81.35% 82.78% 80.63% 
Spells that are right-censored 18.65% 17.22% 19.37% 
 
Table 2. Duration Model for Georgia LIM Medicaid Spells for Children  
(initiated between December 2004 & December 2005) 
 
Variable hazard 
standard 
error p-value 
absolute 
effect 
high impact first recertification 2.62 0.02 0.00 11.96% 
female 1.02 0.01 0.01 4.65% 
Non-white 0.97 0.01 0.00 4.43% 
age under 1 0.48 0.00 0.00 2.18% 
age 1-5 0.78 0.01 0.00 3.58% 
age 6-12 0.79 0.01 0.00 3.63% 
high unemployment month 0.84 0.01 0.00 3.83% 
time 1.10 0.00 0.00 5.04% 
time squared 1.00 0.00 0.00 4.56% 
low impact first recertification 2.10 0.03 0.00 9.61% 
other recertification 1.21 0.01 0.00 5.53% 
     
# spells 121,434    
# exits 98,788    
log-likelihood -153,524.64    
avg. spell length 17.80    
avg. exit probability 4.57%    
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Table 3. Simulation Results 
 
   
High Impact  
First Recert 
Low Impact 
First Recert 
start with:  100,000 100,000 
end of month 1:  95,429 95,429 
end of month 2:  91,067 91,067 
end of month 3:  86,905 86,905 
end of month 4:  82,932 82,932 
end of month 5:  79,142 79,142 
end of month 6:  69,675 71,534 
end of month 7:  66,490 68,265 
end of month 8:  63,451 65,144 
end of month 9:  60,550 62,167 
end of month 10:  57,783 59,325 
end of month 11:  55,141 56,613 
end of month 12:  52,094 53,485 
   
Low - High = 1,390 1.39% 
 
 
Table 4. Likelihood of Regaining Public Coverage 
 
  
High Impact 
First Recert 
Low Impact 
First Recert 
# of LIM children that exit at their first recertification 18,618 7,151 
      
# of children that subsequently re-enter public coverage 6,684 2,897 
% 36% 41% 
re-entry route:     
back into Medicaid - LIM 3,557 1,466 
% 53% 51% 
back into Medicaid - RSM 2,625 1,195 
% 39% 41% 
back into CHIP 476 225 
% 7% 8% 
back into Medicaid - SSI 26 11 
% 0.39% 0.38% 
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Table 5. Duration Model for Georgia Medicaid Spells for Children – LIM vs. SSI Children 
(initiated between December 2004 & December 2005) 
 
 LIM  SSI 
high_impact_first_recert 2.62*** 0.84* 
abs. effect 11.96% 1.29% 
low_impact_first_recert 2.10*** 1.04 
abs. effect 9.61% 1.42% 
other_recerts 1.21*** 0.87** 
abs. effect 5.53% 1.34% 
   
# spells 121,434 3,569 
# exits 98,788 1,681 
log-likelihood -153,524.64 -3,755 
avg. spell length 17.80 26.65 
avg. exit probability 4.57% 1.54% 
 
 
 Note: Each column reports the hazard coefficient and absolute effect associated with the 
 recertification indicator of interest.  We indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent 
 level with ***, significance at the 5 percent level with **, and significance at the 1 
 percent level with *. 
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Table 6. Duration Model for Georgia LIM Medicaid Spells for Children,  
with a Nonwhite Interaction Term 
(initiated between December 2004 & December 2005) 
 
variable hazard standard error p-value 
high impact first recertification 2.04 0.02 0.00 
non-white X high impact 1.32 0.02 0.00 
female 1.02 0.01 0.01 
Non-white 0.93 0.01 0.00 
age under 1 0.48 0.00 0.00 
age 1-5 0.78 0.01 0.00 
age 6-12 0.79 0.01 0.00 
high unemployment month 0.83 0.01 0.00 
time 1.10 0.00 0.00 
time squared 1.00 0.00 0.00 
low impact first recertification 2.11 0.03 0.00 
other recertification 1.17 0.01 0.00 
    
# spells 121,434   
# exits 98,788   
log-likelihood -153,672.11   
avg. spell length 17.80   
avg. exit probability 4.57%   
 
 
